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Abstract
Background: Since its initiation in 2005, the Harvard Personal Genome Project has enrolled thousands of
volunteers interested in publicly sharing their genome, health and trait data. Because these data are highly
identifiable, we use an ‘open consent’ framework that purposefully excludes promises about privacy and requires
participants to demonstrate comprehension prior to enrollment.
Discussion: Our model of non-anonymous, public genomes has led us to a highly participatory model of
researcher-participant communication and interaction. The participants, who are highly committed volunteers, self-
pursue and donate research-relevant datasets, and are actively engaged in conversations with both our staff and
other Personal Genome Project participants. We have quantitatively assessed these communications and donations,
and report our experiences with returning research-grade whole genome data to participants. We also observe
some of the community growth and discussion that has occurred related to our project.
Summary: We find that public non-anonymous data is valuable and leads to a participatory research model, which
we encourage others to consider. The implementation of this model is greatly facilitated by web-based tools and
methods and participant education. Project results are long-term proactive participant involvement and the growth
of a community that benefits both researchers and participants.
Background
The Personal Genome Project (PGP) was founded on
the premise that highly integrated and comprehensive
personal health information - in combination with per-
sonal genome data - is needed to understand the diverse
functional consequences of genetic variation. George
Church’s original proposal anticipated that such highly
identifiable data collection efforts would raise issues with
data sharing and security [1]. He suggested an alterna-
tive approach: avoid promising privacy, and recruit
volunteers who understand the risks and want to make
their personal data available to the public.
Much has happened in the years since the PGP was
initiated nearly a decade ago. The cost of DNA sequen-
cing has dropped another 10,000-fold - an individual
genome is now as cheap as a personal computer. DNA
sequencing has greatly expanded, not only resulting in
improved interpretation of ancestry and trait informa-
tion, but also in an ever-increasing potential for breaches
of data security as more people have access to this data.
A better understanding of the inherent identifiability of
genetic data has also crystallized: individuals can be
detected in aggregate samples [2], genotypes can be pre-
dicted from expression data [3], and genealogy databases
can be used to infer surnames from Y-chromosome gen-
etic data and re-identify dozens of ‘anonymous’ genomes
[4]. There will always be some project-specific informa-
tion that can be hard to obfuscate, for example, pedigree
information based on co-existing samples from relatives,
participant age range, and location and time period of
sample collections. (Many of these data are typically in-
cluded in a standard ‘methods’ section upon publica-
tion.) When this information is combined with public
records, re-identification appears to be far more feasible
than described by many studies’ consent forms and typ-
ically believed by their participants
a.
The PGP clearly abstains from any assurance to partic-
ipants of privacy or anonymity, and the ‘open consent’
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standard human subjects research. The open consent
model is based on the perspective that autonomous de-
cision making and valid consent require complete and
truthful information (veracity), and that unsustainable
promises of anonymity result in invalid consent [5].
With growing concerns regarding identifiability and ob-
vious difficulties in securing data, truthful information
about the limitations of privacy protection measures is
increasingly seen as a necessary component of informed
consent - especially when generating much-needed fully
consented public datasets [6].
The non-anonymous approach to creating public gen-
ome and health data has led us to a highly participatory
project model. As we describe below, our project makes
special efforts to educate and test potential participants
to ensure that they understand the potential conse-
quences of participation. As a result, participants show a
high level of engagement in the project as demonstrated
by their high rate of voluntary contributions of data. In
addition, we believe public non-anonymous data should
imply that participants have access to their research-grade
genome data. In keeping with this, we not only return data
to participants but also give them access through their pro-
ject identifier (for example, ‘hu43860C’). Thus, participants
have the ongoing ability to follow the research uses of
samples and data they have contributed. Although public
release of data is difficult to reverse, participants may with-
draw at any time and request removal of data and samples
from our databases. We also maintain an ongoing relation-
ship with all participants to collect knowledge regarding the
consequences of participation. We share here our experi-
ences and recommendations in the hopes of assisting
other groups that may be considering similar new re-
search models.
Research at the Harvard PGP discussed herein was ap-
proved by the Committee on Human Studies of Harvard
Medical School and Harvard School of Dental Medicine
(Approval #FWA00007071), supervised by a Data Safety
Monitoring Board and conducted in accordance with
the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. Harvard
PGP participants named in this manuscript have given
informed consent to publicly share their name and their
associated participant data outside of the study context
of the Personal Genome Project.
Discussion
The Personal Genome Project enrollment process
In society, a wide diversity of preferences exist with re-
spect to levels of privacy, and many individuals choose
to participate in the Harvard PGP despite the lack of
assurance of privacy and anonymity. Enrollment and
participation are very deliberate processes. Prospective par-
ticipants must first verify their eligibility and, although
enrollment is greatly facilitated by an online interface, it
nevertheless requires several steps on the part of the par-
ticipant to demonstrate understanding and consent. Each
of these steps accounts for a fraction of potential partici-
pants that do not ultimately enroll (Figure 1), and in many
cases these are likely individuals who realized that they did
not wish to volunteer.
The most notable step in our online enrollment
process is our requirement for potential participants to
pass an enrollment examination. To ensure the decision
to participate is well-informed, we provide a study guide
and require individuals to correctly answer all questions
on this examination. The examination design is modular
(with each module to be repeated until all questions are
answered correctly), and both our study guide and con-
sent documents are publicly shared so that other studies
may use or adapt them [7]. Our recent data show that
the enrollment examination remains the most significant
barrier in our online enrollment process: 59% of users
who did not complete enrollment in the 2012 to 2013
time period stopped at the enrollment examination
stage. About half of the people (49.8%) who created ac-
counts on our site between June 2012 and December
2013 completed the enrollment process (Figure 1). This
represents an update on our prior analysis of accounts
created until May 2012, which was largely similar, with
Figure 1 Status of 2,294 accounts created June 2012 to
December 2013. About half of all accounts created on our site
eventually complete the enrollment process to become participants
(1,143 users, 50% of all accounts). Of the 1,151 accounts that did not
complete the enrollment process, the majority (674 users, or 59% of
incomplete enrollments) stopped at the enrollment
examination stage.
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[8]. Among those who passed the examination stage,
90% electronically signed the online consent form and
fully enrolled in the project. As of 31 December 2013,
3,181 participants are fully enrolled.
The enrollment examination and the very detailed
consent form emphasize the research-only character
of the PGP, where participants are not expected to
directly benefit. The resulting cohort is therefore
enriched for highly motivated individuals interested
in contributing to the project, and many of our
participant-initiated communications are from partici-
pants interested in donating samples as well as genetic
and health data they have gathered from external
sources (see below).
After enrollment, participants continue to use our web-
site to add data to their public profiles, and to review and
publish the data we return to them. Although developing
and maintaining the participant-facing infrastructure has
been a significant cost, the benefits are apparent. Self-
service makes it more practical for participants to exercise
their will. Sensitive interactions, such as soliciting feedback
during the withdrawal process, are carefully designed and
can be consistently executed. The process of encoding the
study protocol in the form of software sometimes reveals
ambiguities that can be explored and clarified, resulting in
better agreement between researchers’ behavior and partici-
pants’ expectations. Common interactions like enroll-
ment and sample collection can be largely automated,
so the incremental cost of each additional participant
is extremely low. With the intention of making our
participatory approach more accessible to other re-
search projects, we have released the website software
under the GNU General Public License.
Participant communication
Participation in the PGP is an ongoing relationship after
enrollment. Account and data are managed through our
online interface, and participants can use a ‘Contact Us’
button on the website to email us. In the 16 months an-
alyzed here (June 2012 to December 2013; Figure 2), 579
emails were received, which averages about one email
per day. Communications were diverse and included
general interest and questions (for example, regarding
eligibility requirements), interest in donation of data, re-
ports of site bugs and account issues (for example, name
changes), and questions about the timeline of sampling
and return of data.
As in any study, participants can decide to withdraw at
any moment and in the PGP such a decision is not influ-
enced by a patient-physician relationship or opportunities
for clinical interventions. Since online enrollment began in
2010, less than 1% of users who have fully enrolled have
later withdrawn (26 participants); of the nine participants
who shared reasons for withdrawal, five expressed concerns
about privacy that developed after enrollment, and four
expressed frustration with the timeline and requirements
involved for participation. From June 2012 to December
2013, 17 out of 579 emails sent by participants were related
to the issue of withdrawal (3.3%, see Figure 2,‘Withdrawal’).
Of the 185 participants who have publicly shared whole
genome or exome data, none have withdrawn from the
project.
Participant experiences with the return of genome data
Most projects that create biological data and cell lines
do not return data to participants. Samples are typically
stripped of identifying data to protect the privacy of
participants - although there is increasing recognition
Figure 2 Participant-initiated communications. Our website offers participants a ‘Contact Us’ button. From June 2012 to December 2013, we
received 579 emails from participants. Few support requests derived from the return of genome data (3.6% of all emails, representing 11% of
participants receiving genome data). Most of these were inquiries regarding data formats and additional files for the participants’ own analyses of
their data (2.9%), rather than requests for additional interpretation on our part (0.7%).
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re-identification, it nevertheless theoretically renders re-
searchers unable to return data to their study partici-
pants. Other rationales for not returning data include
concerns regarding misuse of data as a clinical tool, and
potentially burdensome participant requests for assist-
ance with data interpretation. Modern genotyping and
sequencing technologies should cause us to question the
coherence of this traditional approach, especially when
projects generate public sequence data. Individuals now
have ready access to deep genetic data about themselves
through direct-to-consumer services, with one million
single nucleotide polymorphism datasets available for
$100 to $200. The difference between ‘public data’ and
‘access to one’s personal data’ is essentially reduced to
the effort a participant must make to identify which
public dataset is their own.
Access to and return of data is one of the core compo-
nents of PGP [9], and the PGP has so far returned whole
genome data to 163 individuals. (Our total of 185 in-
cludes an additional 22 individuals that have shared gen-
ome or exome data obtained elsewhere). We emphasize
to participants that our data is research-grade (that is,
not for clinical use) and that many types of error are
possible, including errors in data, failure to discover or
report significant genetic issues, and ambiguous or
false positive findings. We also provide access to genome
interpretations as produced by the Genomes-Environments-
Trait (GET)-Evidence system, which provides a mechanism
for continued improvement in genome interpretation and
annotation through participant engagement and commu-
n i t yr e v i e wo ft h es c i e n t i f i cl i t e r a t u r e[ 8 ] .O n l yas m a l lf r a c -
tion (11%) of participants who received whole genome data
have contacted us regarding that data. Of these, only a mi-
nority (19%, or 0.8% of total communications) are seeking
additional knowledge regarding interpretation, and most
(81%, or 3.3% of total communications) are inquiries re-
garding file formats and access to additional data files,
made by participants interested in self-pursuit of additional
analysis.
The continued application of our GET-Evidence sys-
tem has been used to record interpretations of a variety
of variants found in participant genomes. These inter-
pretations are publicly shared on the GET-Evidence
website [10]. Our overall experience generally continues
to be one of ‘false positives’, variants reported to cause
phenotypes that the participant does not appear to have.
We believe these are generally due to a lack of statistical
significance in original literature rather than sequencing er-
rors (notably, sequencing errors are randomly distributed
and unlikely to match a previously reported variant).
One false-positive variant that is a useful illustration for
the uncertainties in genome interpretation is SCN5A-
G615E. This variant was found in a participant who is
identified in our public dataset as hu034DB1. Several publi-
cations implicate it as a cause of long-QT syndrome.
Recommendations released by the American College of
Medical Genetics (ACMG) [11] recommend that clinical
studies report known pathogenic variants (defined as ‘previ-
ously reported and a recognized cause of the disorder’)a n d
expected pathogenic variants (defined as ‘previously unre-
ported and is of the type which is expected to cause the dis-
order’)i nSCN5A. How do we determine which variants
meet these criteria? A non-skeptical reading of the litera-
ture would define variant SCN5A-G615E as a known
pathogenic variant. However, we observed that none of
these publications demonstrated variant-specific statistically
significant enrichment for this variant in cases versus con-
trols. We also confirmed that our participant reported no
family history consistent with this disease, and that she pur-
sued clinical evaluation after learning of this variant and
was not diagnosed with the disease. Although disease may
later manifest in this participant, we have yet to discover a
case of unexpected disease in which the causal variant’s
pathogenic hypothesis lacked statistical significance. Our
experience, in the context of incidental findings, is that the
ACMG recommendations provide little guidance when
there is no accompanying variant-specific consensus re-
garding which variants within those genes warrant clinical
response.
We also have at least one ‘true positive’ to report: one
participant discovered an unanticipated disease after gen-
ome sequencing revealed a rare genetic variant. JAK2-
V617F, found in a blood sample donated by huA90CE6, is
an acquired mutation associated with myeloproliferative
disorders
b. Although this gene is not included in the
ACMG recommendations, our evaluation of the literature
concluded that a significant fraction of carriers later de-
velop myeloproliferative disorders. Although this partici-
p a n tw a sn o ts u s p e c t e do fh a v i n ga n yg e n e t i cd i s e a s e ,
he had a past medical incident involving a blood clot
and, upon self-pursued clinical evaluation subsequent
to detection of this variant, was discovered to have abnor-
mally high platelets (essential thrombocytosis) and now
treats this with low-dose aspirin. The participant, as a
journalist, reported this expe r i e n c ei na na r t i c l es e r i e s
for Bloomberg News [12].
Participant-contributed data
Our study allows participants to autonomously contrib-
ute diverse data to be shared on their public profiles,
and many of the emails we receive from participants are
inquiries about such contributions (14.3% of emails in
the period from June 2012 to December 2013, see
Figure 2). To facilitate donation of health records, we
have supported import of data from Google Health (now
discontinued) and Microsoft Healthvault in Continuity
of Care Record format. We parse health conditions from
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to share the raw data files themselves, but these files
contain sensitive personal data (for example, full names
of participants, their health care providers, and email ad-
dresses) - even participants open about their account
identity may not wish to have all such information
publicly shared. In the interest of facilitating future pub-
lic datasets, we encourage developers of health record
management systems to allow individuals to remove
their personal identifiers and contact information when
exporting records. As of December 2013, 1,235 partici-
pants (39% of 3,191 enrolled participants) have contrib-
uted health record data through these resources.
Parsing these records gives us a valuable insight into
the health and trait data represented in the participant
cohort. We recognized, however, that these data can be
non-uniform; for example, there are many traits partici-
pants may not think to report because they are common
or mostly benign. To address this, we created a series of
12 surveys spanning 239 phenotypes (Additional file 1)
based on the traits and conditions listed in our health
record data. In order to allow for the discovery of unknown
associations between variants and hypothesis generation,
the range is intentionally broad, ranging from extremely
common traits (for example, myopia, dental caries) to mod-
erately rare conditions (for example, porphyria, Marfan syn-
drome). As of December 2013, 680 participants (21%) have
completed all 12 surveys to add trait and disease data to
their public profiles. Among the 185 participants who have
released whole genome or exome data, 133 (72%) have
completed all 12 surveys.
Participant willingness to contribute data extends be-
yond health data. Many inquiries we receive are from
participants interested in donating genetic data acquired
elsewhere (8.2% of participant-initiated communications,
see Figure 2). As of 31 December 2013, 462 participants
have shared through their public profiles genetic data ac-
quired from other sources. This is primarily composed
of single nucleotide polymorphism genotyping data, but
also includes 22 whole genome and exome datasets.
Building a participatory research community
Forgoing the assurances of privacy and allowing partici-
pants to publicly share identifiable data has shown practical
benefits. One important difference we have discovered is
that participants are no longer isolated: participants and re-
searchers have been able to meet each other at our yearly
GET conference. Participants have also formed participant-
managed online groups, including groups on LinkedIn and
Facebook and an online forum [13]. The formation of a
participant community allows participants to share know-
ledge, participation experiences, news items of interest, and
mutual assistance with the understanding of research data.
Public data inspires important discussions. In January
2013, Gymrek et al. used publicly available data from
HapMap project samples to demonstrate re-identification
methods [4], and later that year another group used our
project’s data for similar research [14]. Notably, because
these data are public, this research is considered exempt ac-
cording to exemption 4 of the ‘Common Rule’ of Health
and Human Services regulations (45 CFR part 46 subpart
A) [15]. No PGP participants withdrew from the project
because of these incidents, demonstrating their correct un-
derstanding of the public nature of their data with PGP.
However, these events highlight a concern for participants
in mainstream studies whose data or specimens have been
shared publicly and for whom privacy was assured: there is
currently no requirement for ethical oversight of re-
identification efforts conducted by researchers in the US if
they work with publicly available material [16].
Many PGP participants choose to be public about their
identity, and some of these have written about the pro-
ject to share their personal experiences with genome
data, as well as broader lessons about genome research
and technology. This includes the reporting by John
Lauerman mentioned earlier [12], an editorial by Steven
Pinker [17], and a book by Misha Angrist [18]. With
these writers we can see one of the great potential bene-
fits of participatory research: bridging the divide between
researchers and their community to more broadly share
scientific understanding.
Summary
New approaches are needed to create public genome
and health data collections. Reflecting this, a growing
number of projects interested in creating public data
and materials, including the Encyclopedia of DNA Ele-
ments project and the National Institute of Standards
and Technology Genome In A Bottle consortium, are
now working together with the PGP [19]. A tremendous
amount of genomics research will be required before
clinical utility is established with high confidence on
some genetic variants, and studies that include a gen-
omic component may, in aggregate, require the study of
very large numbers of individuals before such utility can be
established. By promoting non-redundant efforts through
public and participant data sharing, participatory research
projects like the PGP have the potential to efficiently pave
the way to this goal.
We demonstrate that it is feasible for a research study
to publicly share combined genomic and health data.
When engaged in a participatory manner, participants
can be highly motivated to help create these resources:
many go beyond volunteering for the uncertainties of
public research data, to also volunteer their time and ef-
forts to help create that data. The outcomes for public
genome and health data will continue to be explored by
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experiences to report. We can also report positive expe-
riences including the ongoing participatory learning ex-
perience this project represents for both its participants
and researchers.
Recent studies on re-identification of individuals from
genomic data reinforce one of the founding premises of the
PGP’s open-consent framework. In contrast to research
studies in the pre-genomics era, we demonstrate that in-
formed consent regarding the potential for participant re-
identification may now be ethically mandated for a wide
range of studies in the post-genomics era. We strongly rec-
ommend that researchers interested in generating data that
is to be publicly shared be clear with their participants
about the re-identifiability of that data. This increased
transparency may in turn give rise to models that retain re-
lationships with participants, allowing ongoing interaction
in the management of the data.
In the process of building our own project, we have
also learned some lessons that, although anecdotal, pro-
vide insights that may help others facing similar issues.
One thing we have learned is that online, automated
methods greatly facilitate participant education, enroll-
ment, notification, and provision of access to resulting
study data, and allow participants to manage and release
data. We have also found that, despite concerns regard-
ing genome interpretation as being costly, its implemen-
tation is relatively straightforward in the context of
providing participants with access to personal research
data. The process is greatly facilitated by automation,
and concerns arising from participant access to research
data can be addressed through education and careful ex-
planation. Communicating the uncertainties of research
and emphasizing potential errors helps to clarify to par-
ticipants that, while research data may contain incidental
findings, these are not clinical data and would need clin-
ical validation to justify any clinical response. Rather
than focusing solely on the costs of data interpretation,
we recommend research studies planning to return data
allocate resources for participant education and commu-
nications regarding the process of sample analysis and
data creation. Research timelines are much slower, sam-
ples analysis is more prone to failure, and the resulting
data is less user-friendly than participants would expect
from a commercial or medical test.
As we continue to record and report our experiences
with public data, return of data and participatory re-
search, we expect the process will continue to improve
for both us and other groups.
We believe that openness about the research process
in a way that makes it highly interactive helps to com-
municate the realities of research to participants. Even
though participants are not expected to personally bene-
fit from the study, their engagement can significantly
benefit the entire research community by providing im-
portant feedback that can be used to improve and evolve
study designs. It is our hope that the experiences and
lessons from the PGP’s open and participatory model
will encourage other groups to adopt similar approaches
in their research studies.
Endnotes
aFrom the 1000 Genomes consent form: ‘Because of
these measures, it will be very hard for anyone who
looks at any of the scientific databases to know which
information came from you, or even that any informa-
tion in the scientific databases came from you’.
bThis mutation was likely observed because DNA puri-
fied from raw blood contains a mixture of tissue sources,
including myeloid lineages. We believe it is unlikely this
acquired mutation would be observed if genome sequen-
cing is from lymphocyte cell lines or other tissue that
does not include myeloid lineages.
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